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I. INTRODUCTION
When Winter Haven attorney Silvia S. Ibanez advertised her quali-
fications as a member of The Florida Bar, as a certified public ac-
countant (CPA), and as a certified financial planner (CFP), she knew
she was telling the truth about her qualifications. She also thought she.
was providing information to her clients and potential clients that
would help them make informed choices. The Florida Board of
Accountancy' (the Board), however, saw Ibanez's advertisements
quite differently. The Board attempted to reprimand her for using the
initials JD, CPA, and CFP in her telephone advertisements, on her
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Lacey A. Collier, United States District Court, Northern
District of Florida. B.A., 1983, University of Massachusetts; J.D., 1995, Florida State Univer-
sity.
1. The Board of Accountancy is a unit of the Florida Department of Business & Profes-
sional Regulation.
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business cards, and on her firm letterhead. 2 The Board proposed a
reprimand and accused Ibanez of engaging in false, misleading, and
deceptive advertising.
Ibanez fought back, challenging the Board's action before a state
administrative tribunal, in state court and, ultimately, in front of the
United States Supreme Court, asserting her right to advertise truthful
information that could be useful to potential clients.4 The Supreme
Court decided in Ibanez's favor by upholding her right to advertise
her professional qualifications. 5 In doing so, the Court affirmed the
standards for government regulation of commercial speech that it an-
nounced in 1980 with Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York and has consistently affirmed in
the years since.7 The popular press heralded Ibanez's fight and the
Court's decision in her case as a vindication of free speech.' Others,
2. In its reprimand, the Board charged Ibanez with three counts of violating Florida stat-
utes and administrative regulations governing accountants. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. &
Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2086 (1994). For a discussion of the precise
charges, see infra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
The day before she argued her case pro se in front of the United States Supreme Court, lbanez
was quoted as saying: "What I'm trying to do is to vindicate our constitutional right to express
ourselves so long as it's truthful and valuable to the public." Rosalind Resnick, Accountant
Takes Case to Highest Court; Argues for Right To Advertise as CPA but Not Practice, Mltlf
HERALD, Apr. 18, 1994, Business Magazine at 9.
3. Telephone Interview with Silvia S. Ibanez (Dec. 19, 1994). The Board had initially con-
sidered a $5,000 fine in addition to the letter of reprimand but did not approve that additional
sanction. Id.
4. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2086.
5. Id.
At several points in its opinion, the Court noted that the State had failed to meet its burden.
For example: "We have never sustained restrictions on constitutionally protected speech based
on a record so bare as the one on which the Board relies here." Id. at 2091. See also infra note
48 and accompanying text.
Ibanez was the third professional commercial speech case from Florida that the Court has
accepted in as many terms. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (holding that Florida's
ban on in-person solicitation by CPAs violated First Amendment protection of truthful, non-
deceptive information proposing lawful commercial transactions); see also Went For It, Inc. v.
The Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 2371 (1995) (upholding as constitutional The Florida Bar's 30-day ban on targeted direct-
mail solicitation of potential personal injury and wrongful death clients).
6. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (setting out a four-part test for the regulation of commercial
speech). For a discussion of the Central Hudson test, see infra notes 107-112 and accompanying
text.
7. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (reaffirming that a regulation of
truthful commercial speech must advance substantial state interests in a "direct and material
way" and be in "reasonable proportion to the interests served").
8. See Resnick, supra note 2; see also Paul Anderson, Lawyer Wins Right To Advertise as
a CPA; Florida Attorney Argued Own Case, MitAw HERALD, June 14, 1994, Business at Cl
(quoting Sydney Traum, president of the 150-member Florida Association of Attorney-CPAs as
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however, have been less enthusiastic about the holding in Ibanez and
the impact it will have on regulation of professional advertising. 9
This Note examines Ibanez and considers the substantial govern-
ment interests states must demonstrate before they may regulate truth-
ful commercial speech. 0 It concludes that the Ibanez Court failed in
its reasoning and holding to extend-under its own precedent-the
maximum possible protection to consumers who may be misled, or at
least left uninformed, by professional advertising similar in content
and form to that used by Ibanez.'
II. IBANEZ: ATTEMPTING TO REGULATE TRUTHFUL
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
As case law in general and Ibanez in particular indicate, the Su-
preme Court's rules for regulating professional advertising have been
on a course toward increasingly well-settled doctrine. 12 This trend not-
withstanding,' 3 state interpretation and application of those rules has
been less settled as state bar associations and other regulatory agencies
explore their power in an attempt to prevent public disrespect for the
practice of law and other professions through restrictions on other-
wise protected professional commercial speech.'
4
saying "The impact is that the chilling restrictions against commercial speech are lifted.
THE ArroRNEY-CPA, a newsletter of the American Association of Attorney-Certified Public
Accountants, announced the decision under a bold headline declaring "The Ibanez Decision:
Silvia Wins!" 30 THa ATrroRNY-CPA 1 (Summer 1994). USA TODAY reported the decision
under a headline stating High Court Rallies to Free Speech. Tony Mauro, High Court Rallies to
Free Speech, USA TODAY, June 14, 1994, at Al.
9. Telephone Interview with Edward A. Tellechea, Assistant Ethics Counsel for The Flor-
ida Bar (Dec. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Tellechea Interview]. Mr. Tellechea, who attended the Iba-
nez oral arguments, views the Ibanez decision as relatively unremarkable in the area of attorney
advertising and instead suggests the case should be viewed as a poorly handled prosecution of an
unlicensed accounting practice. Id.
10. See infra notes 15-152 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text. Although one recent.case, Went For It,
Inc. v. The Florida Bar, may have caused some unsettling in the Court's commercial speech
doctrine, just how much unsettling remains to be seen after the five-to-four decision because the
Court specifically distinguished generalized advertising from targeted direct-mail advertising as
less-intrusive and less-offensive to individuals. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). In dissent, Justice Ken-
nedy proclaimed the Court's decision a "serious departure, not only from our prior decisions
involving attorney advertising, but also from the principles that govern the transmission of com-
mercial speech." Id. at 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13. See Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994).
14. See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
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A. The Facts
1. Advertising the Truth
Silvia Ibanez is a sole legal practitioner who holds degrees in busi-
ness administration and law;"' she has been licensed to deal in securi-
ties, annuities, and insurance; she is a certified circuit court mediator;
and she established her own financial planning firm in 1985 and oper-
ated it until 1988, when she started her law practice. 7 She has been a
member of The Florida Bar since 1983.18 As a CPA, she is licensed by
the Board of Accountancy to perform the "attest" function of audit-
ing.' 9 She also holds the designation of CFP, issued by the Certified
Financial Planner Board of Standards, a private, non-profit group.
20
Ibanez believed that all of these qualifications could be important to
potential clients, so she included them on her letterhead, on her busi-
ness cards, and in telephone book listings.
2'
2. The Complaint
The Florida Board of Accountancy issued a complaint against Iba-
nez after an anonymous source sent a page torn from the Winter Ha-
ven Yellow Pages directory. 22 Circled on the telephone book page was
15. University of Miami. 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY FL446P (1995).
16. University of Puerto Rico, 1983. Id.
17. Brief for Petitioner at *5, 1993 WL 723402 (Feb. 28, 1994), Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of
Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) [hereinafter Petitioner's Briefi.
18. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2086 (1994).
19. Under the Florida Public Accountancy Act, only licensed CPAs can attest that the pre-
sentation of financial information is reliable and fair. Ibarez, 114 S. Ct. at 2085.
Ibanez earned her CPA license in 1982 and for a time worked with the accounting firms of
Coopers & Lybrand and Main Hurdman, where she performed all aspects of tax practice for
individuals and businesses. Brief for Respondent at '2, 1994 WL 114666 (Mar. 30, 1994), lbanez
v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994) [hereinafter
Respondent's Brief].
20. Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at *2.
21. Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at *6. The state hearing officer who tried the
Board's disciplinary complaint agreed.
The use of the term CPA implies a specific competency to the public. The fact the
Ibanez is a CPA is valuable to her legal clients. CPA status is a valuable property right
to each CPA, and the ability of the practicing attorney to publicize the fact that s/he
holds an active CPA license is a valuable asset to that individual.
Id.
Ibanez's use of her JD designation in her advertising was not at issue with The Florida Bar.
The Florida Bar rules allow the designation of JD, as well as CPA and CFP. FLORIDA BAR RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.2(n)(3) (1993).
22. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 17, at *5.
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Ibanez's attorney advertisement, which included the initials CPA and
CFP next to her name.23 Upon investigation, the Board discovered her
other uses of CPA and CFP. 4 In spite of the veracity of her advertise-
ments, 2 the Board charged in its administrative complaint that she
violated the Board's "holding-out" rule, which prohibited Ibanez and
others from advertising her status as a CPA unless she practiced as
one .2 The three-count complaint also charged that Ibanez was practic-
ing public accountancy in an unlicensed accounting firm,27 was using a
specialty designation-CFP-not approved by the Board 2 and, by ad-
vertising her CPA designation, was implying that she had complied
with the Public Accountancy Act's prohibition against "fraudulent,
false, deceptive, or misleading" advertising. 29 The Board asserted Iba-
nez was holding herself out as a CPA through an unlicensed account-
ing firm-a fact Ibanez readily acknowledged-and therefore "an
uninformed person may not be able to differentiate whether she is in
the practice of public accounting."30
23. She was listed in the yellow pages of the telephone book under the attorneys heading as
"Ibanez, Silvia, S., CPA, CFP." In the white pages, she was listed as "Ibanez, Silvia S., CPA
CFP atty." Her business card stated "Silvia Safille Ibanez, JD, CPA, CFP." Respondent's
Brief, supra note 19, at *2.
24. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2086 (1994).
25. "Notwithstanding the apparently truthful nature of her communication-it is undis-
puted that neither her CPA licqnse nor her CFP certification has been revoked-the Board repri-
manded her for engaging in 'false, deceptive, and misleading' advertising." Id. at 2086.
26. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 17, at *5; see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 19,
at *2. The Board filed its complaint on June 13, 1991. The "holding-out" rule allowed only the
display of a CPA license by any Florida CPA who is not practicing public accountancy. FLA.
AD N. CODE ANN. r. 61H1-20.012 (1994).
27. Ibanez, 114.S. Ct. at 2087.
See FLA. STAT. § 473.3101 (1993). Just days before the administrative hearing on these
charges, the Board dropped the count alleging that Ibanez was operating an unlicensed account-
ing firm. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2087. See also FLA. ADmNs. CODE ANN. r. 61H1-24.001(l)(g)
(1994).
The Board's dropping of the unlicensed accounting firm charge perplexed members of the
Court, who made clear during oral argument that they were frustrated with having been pre-
sented a "botched" licensure case in the form of a professional advertising case. Tellechea Inter-
view, supra note 9. "It was a lousy case. It shouldn't have been up there in the first place." Id.
The Florida Bar filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Ibanez. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2086.
28. Id. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61HI-24.001(1)(g) (1994).
29. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2087.
30. Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at *4. The charges alleged violations of Title 21,
Florida Administrative Code, and chapter 473, Florida Statutes. Respondent's Brief, supra note
19, at *4. Specifically, she was charged with "[ajdvertising goods or services in a manner which
is fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading in form or content .... FLA. STAY. § 473.323(0
(1993). The "holding-out" rule provides for a violation under section 473.302(4), Florida Stat-
utes, when a
licensee is a certified public accountant when providing, or offering to provide services
82 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:77
Ibanez responded to the Board's disciplinary complaint and filed an
additional complaint under the Florida Administrative Procedure
Act 31 challenging the validity of the Board's "holding-out" rule.1
2
During the administrative challenge, Ibanez freely admitted her use of
the CPA designation, asserted that her legal clients derived benefit
from her training and experience as an accountant, and protested the
Board of Accountancy's attempt to impose jurisdiction over her legal
practice.33 The hearing officer decided in favor of Ibanez, finding the
"holding-out" rule to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority because the rule
seems intended to prohibit publication of a licensee's CPA status
when that publication would confuse or mislead consumers as to
whether the licensee is performing public accounting services ....
The rule does not accomplish that intent, but rather utterly confuses
a licensee as to when an activity, legitimate on its face, is proscribed
and subject to disciplinary prosecution.
The Board seeks to impose disciplinary oversight to protect the
public against both fraud and negligence, but one statutory and
regulatory scheme ranges far beyond that legitimate purpose,
contrary to the expressed legislative intent for the Board. The rule is
overbroad, vague, contradictory, and ambiguous.1
4
In her disciplinary proceeding, Ibanez argued that she was practic-
ing law, not accountancy, and therefore should not be subject to the
Board's regulatory power.35 She argued that her advertising was noth-
ing more than "nonmisleading, truthful, commercial speech.""6 For
or products to the public, in such a manner that an uninformed person may not be
able to differentiate whether or not the licensee may also be in the practice of public
accounting. The display of the CPA certificate and license issued by the Department
of Business and Professional Regulation shall not constitute holding out under the
terms of this rule. All other publication of the fact that a licensee is a CPA constitutes
holding oneself out.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61H1-20.012 (Sept. 1994) (repealed Nov. 21, 1994).
31. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1993).
32. Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at *5; 14 F.A.L.R. 1396 (Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Prof.
Reg. 1992) (declaring invalid FLA. ADmiN CODE ANN. r. 21A-20.012 (1992)).
Ibanez appeared pro se at the disciplinary proceedings, in her administrative challenge of the
"holding-out" rule and before the Supreme Court. She later moved for nearly $50,000 in attor-
ney fees but was denied. 14 F.A.L.R. 5582 (Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Prof. Reg. 1992).
33. Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at *5.
34. 14 F.A.L.R. 1396 (Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Prof. Reg. 1992).
35. lbanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2087 (1994). Ibanez argued that she does not perform the "attest" function and that none of the
work she does in her law practice could be considered services requiring a CPA license. Id. She
eventually acknowledged, however, that the Board had jurisdiction over her as a CPA. Id.
36. Id.
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some reason, the Board dropped its single count of practicing public
accounting in an unlicensed firm, and subsequently, the hearing offi-
cer ruled in Ibanez's favor on all remaining counts.
37
The Board, however, rejected the hearing officer's recommended
order, substituted its own final agency order and found Ibanez guilty
of "false, deceptive, and misleading" advertising. 8 The final agency
order reasoned that to attach the initials CPA to one's advertising was
to invoke the Board's jurisdiction.39 The Board asserted that Ibanez
had so invoked its jurisdiction, but then denied the Board's authority
to regulate her activity as an attorney. 4° This, the Board reasoned, was
to render her use of the CPA designation misleading to the public be-
cause the Board protects the public by regulating CPAs. For Ibanez to
flout Board jurisdiction, members reasoned, was to leave the public
not knowing to whom Ibanez should answer for regulatory viola-
tions. 4' The Board also held against Ibanez for her use of the CFP
designation, reasoning that any use of the word "certified" to refer to
any organization other than the Board "inherently misleads the public
into believing that state approval and recognition exists." 4
B. The Holding
Ibanez appealed the Board's final order, and the First District
Court of Appeal issued a per curiam affirmance without opinion.
4
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari" and subsequently re-
versed the Board's final order.4
5
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2088. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency may override a hearing
officer's ruling and enter a final order contrary to the officer's ruling. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1993);
FLA. CONST. art. IV.
39. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2088.
40. Id.
41. Id.
[Ibanez) advertises the fact that she is a CPA, while performing the same 'accounting'
activities she performed when she worked for licensed CPA firms, but she does not
concede that she is engaged in the practice of public accounting so as to bring herself
within the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy for any negligence or errors [of
which] she may be guilty when delivering her services to her clients.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 621 So. 2d 435 (Fla.
Ist DCA 1993). Under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, parties substantially affected
by an agency action have a right of direct appeal to the District Court of Appeal. FLA. STAT. ch.
120 (1993); FLA. CONST. art. IV.
44. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 751
(1994). Ibanez was the only case of more than 5,000 that the First District Court of Appeal
considered in 1993 that went directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Robert Benton, remarks
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Ibanez, issued on the same day as another noteworthy decision up-
holding First Amendment principles,4 was a strong reaffirmation of
the principle that state actors must show substantial government inter-
est if they seek to regulate truthful advertising.
4 7
The record reveals that the Board has not shouldered the burden it
must carry in matters of this order. It has not demonstrated with
sufficient specificity that any member of the public could have been
misled by Ibanez's constitutionally protected speech or that any
harm could have resulted from allowing that speech to reach the
public's eyes. We therefore hold that the Board's decision censuring
Ibanez is incompatible with First Amendment restraints on official
action .4
The Court unanimously upheld Ibanez's right to use the CPA desig-
nation in her attorney advertising and on her law office letterhead.49
The Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, also upheld her right to advertise her
CFP status without a disclaimer identifying the organization that had
conferred the designation. 0
C. The Reasoning
Stated broadly, the Court was faced with two issues: whether Silvia
Ibanez was subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy
even though she was practicing only law and not accountancy; and
whether, in spite of the apparent truthfulness of her advertising, the
Board could restrict her use of professional designations she had
earned and maintained according to the requirements of reputable
conferring organizations. 1
Initially, Ibanez asserted that, although she was a licensee of the
Board, the Board had no power to exercise jurisdiction over her
to students visiting the court with Professor Eleanor Hunter's Florida State University College of
Law class in Florida Constitutional Law, Oct. 13, 1994.
45. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2088 (1994).
46. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (striking an ordinance banning yard
signs after a homeowner opposed to Operation Desert Storm was barred from posting a yard
sign in protest of the Persian Gulf War).
47. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2084. For a discussion of the hierarchy of First Amendment pro-
tections for speech, see infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
48. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Licensure for certified public accountancy is regulated by chapter 473, Florida Stat-
utes. FLA. STAT. §§ 473.306-.308, .312 (1993). To become a CPA, applicants must have earned a
baccalaureate degree in accounting or its equivalent, must be of good moral character, and must
sit for a state exam. Id. §§ 473.306-.308.
1995] PROTECTING TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING: IBANEZ 85
because she did not engage in any professional services that could be
construed as public accountancy. 2 The Board argued to the Court
that by using the CPA designation in her advertising, Ibanez was tell-
ing the public that she abided by all rules and regulations of the
Board. But by denying the Board's jurisdiction, the Board argued that
"she believes and acts as though she is not" subject to its jurisdic-
tion. 53 The Board provided no evidence beyond Ibanez's assertions de-
nying Board jurisdiction to prove that she actually was flouting Board
regulations. 54 Ruling on this first issue, the Court held that regardless
of the Board's ability to exert regulatory jurisdiction over her, Iba-
nez's beliefs alone were not grounds for sanction." The Court relied
on Baird v. State Bar of Arizona 6 in holding that neither Ibanez's
beliefs nor the Board's mere assertions of her unwillingness to comply
with Board regulations would be sufficient to justify official disci-
pline:
To survive constitutional review, the Board must build its case on
specific evidence of noncompliance. Ibanez has neither been charged
with, nor found guilty of, any professional activity or practice out of
compliance with the governing statutory or regulatory standards.
And as long as Ibanez holds an active CPA license from the Board,
we cannot imagine how consumers can be misled by her truthful
representation to that effect.
7
The Court next addressed the Board's contention that use of the
CFP designation was inherently or potentially misleading, a threshold
requirement for state regulation of commercial speech. The Board
contended that otherwise uninformed consumers would know that the
state had "certified" Ibanez as a public accountant and would
52. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 17, at *28.
53. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089; see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 19, at *20 (stating
"use of the CPA designation ... where the licensee is unwilling to comply with the provisions
of the [statute] under which the license was granted, is inherently misleading and may be prohib-
ited.").
54. 114 S. Ct. at 2089.
55. Id. Curiously, the Board had dropped the only charge that might have supported its
allegations in this regard. Id. By dropping the charge of practicing accountancy through an unli-
censed firm, the Board closed its only avenue to imposing some type of sanction on lbanez. For
a discussion of this point, see infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. This charge was later
refiled after the Court's decision suggested refiling.
56. 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (holding by a 5-to-4 vote that "[tlhe First Amendment's protection
of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him
solely because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds certain
beliefs").
57. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089. Ibanez eventually acknowledged she was a licensee of the
Board and subject to its regulation. Id.
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therefore assume erroneously that because Florida had conferred the
CPA designation on Ibanez, the State also had "certified" her as a
financial planner, when in fact it was a private organization that had
conferred the CFP designation."8 This, the Board asserted, would be
inherently misleading. 9
In rejecting the Board's claim that Ibanez's advertising was inher-
ently misleading, the Court relied on Peel v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois6° when it ruled seven-to-two
that "[tihe Board's justifications for disciplining Ibanez for using the
CFP designation are scarcely more persuasive" than its justification
for sanctioning Ibanez's defiant attitude toward the Board's author-
ity.6' Following Peel, the Court further held that absent any evidence
of actual deception, the Board's "concern about the possibility of de-
ception in hypothetical cases is not. sufficient to rebut the constitu-
tional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment. "2
The Ibanez majority noted that the Peel decision left open the pos-
sibility for regulation of professional advertising when the materials
had the real potential to confuse consumers.63 For example, if an or-
ganization conferring a professional designation were not well known,
the potential for misleading consumers would grow as would the
state's justification for regulation. The Ibanez Court, however, noted
that more than 27,000 people nationwide have earned the CFP desig-
nation and that more than fifty accredited universities and colleges
have established courses of study in financial planning approved by
58. Id. at 2090 n.9.
59. Id.at209ln.ll.
60. 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (holding that only false, deceptive, or misleading commercial
speech may be banned because "disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to
make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such information").
Attorney Gary E. Peel had included on his letterhead a designation indicating he held a "Cer-
tificate in Civil Trial Advocacy" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). Id. at 96.
The Court reversed the state court's censure of Peel because the information on his letterhead
was neither actually nor inherently misleading; it was true, it was verifiable, and there was no
finding that Peel's representation could be misinterpreted as a basis for government certification.
Id. at 108.
We are satisfied that the consuming public understands that licenses-to drive cars, to
operate radio stations, to sell liquor-are issued by governmental authorities and that
a host of certificates-to commend job performance, to convey an educational degree,
to commemorate a solo flight or a hole in one-are issued by private organizations.
Id. at 103.
61. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089.
62. Id. at 2090 (citations omitted) (quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at 91). See also Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1917) ("It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another,
to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort.").
63. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2091.
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the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards. 6" The CFP Board
also requires rigorous examination of candidates before conferring the
CFP designation .65
As in Peel, the Ibanez majority was satisfied that the layperson
would be well protected from such potential confusion and well in-
formed simply by telephoning the organization conferring the spe-
cialty status of certified financial planner." Although the Board of
Accountancy regulates the use of non-Board specialty designations by
requiring automatic disclosure of a conferring organization's full
identity, the Court on this issue deferred to the rules of The Florida
Bar.6 7 The Bar's rules require attorneys to disclose details of their ex-
perience, training, and specialty certifications only when asked.6 8 Fur-
ther, the majority held that to require as detailed a disclaimer as the
Board had sought from Ibanez in her advertisements might prohibit
advertising in the Yellow Pages or on business cards because of space
limitations.69
The Board had attempted to justify its disclaimer requirement by
arguing that placement of the CFP and CPA designations close to one
another was potentially misleading. 70 In response to that contention,
the Court relied on Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio. 7' The Ibanez Court held that the phrase
64. Id.
65. To earn the CFP designation, candidates not only must undergo a course of study but
must pass a licensure exam similar in concept to a CPA or bar exam, must complete CFP-related
work experience, must agree to abide by the CFP Code of Ethics & Professional Responsibility,
and must meet an annual continuing education requirement. Id.
As Justice Scalia noted during the Ibanez oral arguments, while many people may have a sense
that CPA is a state-conferred designation, few are likely to know the meaning of CFP. If CFP
has no meaning to a person, that person cannot be misled by the CFP designation. Tellechea
Interview, supra note 9.
66. 114 S. Ct. at Z090 n.9 ("The Board that reprimanded Ibanez never suggested that such
a call would be significantly more difficult to make than one to the certifying organization in
Peel, the National Board of Trial Advocacy.").
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing FLORIDA BAR RULES OF PROFESSIONAi. CONDUCT Rule 4-7.3(a)(2) (1993),
which would require Ibanez to provide "written information setting forth the factual details of
[her] experience, expertise, background, and training" to potential clients who ask for such in-
formation).
Bar rules permit the use of JD, CPA, CFP, and other "technical and professional licenses
granted by the state or other recognized licensing authorities and educational degrees received,
including dates and institutions." FLORIDA BAR RULES OF PaoFEssoNAL CONDUCT Rule 4-
7.2(n)(3) (1993).
69. 114 S. Ct. at 2090-91.
70. Id. at 2090.
71. 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
In Zauderer, the appellant attorney had advertised that clients' legal fees would be returned if
they were convicted of "drunk driving." Id. at 629. This violated a state bar rule against
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"potentially misleading" could not operate as a shibboleth, the mere
invocation of which would allow those seeking to regulate commercial
speech to overcome their heavy burden of "demonstrat[ing] that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree."
'72
The Zauderer Court quoted In re R.M.J., when it noted that "[t]o
the extent that potentially misleading statements of private certifica-
tion or specialization could confuse consumers, a State might consider
screening certifying organizations or requiring a disclaimer about the
certifying organization or the standards of a specialty."3 The Ibanez
Court affirmed that in the case of truthful advertisements that are
only potentially misleading, disclaimers are an appropriate and nar-
rowly tailored response. 74 The Ibanez Court, however, did not find the
CFP designation or its placement confusing. 7" Had Ibanez's
contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases. Id. The attorney later advertised his willingness to
represent women injured by the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device (IUD) contraceptive. Id. The
ad, which included a line-drawing of the IUD and also stated that clients would owe no fees if
there were no recoveries, generated 106 clients. Id. at 631. The bar charged that he had violated
a rule against using illustrations in advertisements and failed to state that clients might have been
liable for administrative costs even under the IUD contingency fee arrangements. Id. at 632.
The bar rule against illustrations was based on a desire to maintain the decorum of the profes-
sion, but the Court rejected that argument because, in this case, the line-drawing was accurate
and not misleading. Id. at 647-48.
There is, 6f course, no suggestion that the illustration actually used by appellant was
undignified; thus, it is difficult to see how the application of the rule to appellant in
this case directly advances the State's interest in preserving the dignity of attorneys.
More fundamentally, although the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in en-
suring that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in the courtroom, we are
unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communica-
tions with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their
First Amendment rights. Even if that were the case, we are unpersuaded that undigni-
fied behavior would tend to recur so often as to warrant a prophylactic rule.
Id.
72. 114S. Ct. at 2090 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993)).
In Fane ... the Court emphasized that once the threshold test is met, i.e., the speech
is not misleading and related to a lawful activity, the burden is on the State to justify
the restrictions. If the justification advanced by the State is imprecise or not the actual
State interest, it is improper for the Court to supplant or interpolate where the State's
true interest lies.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 17, at *26.
73. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201-03 (1982)).
74. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2088. See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. In that case, the
Court announced:
[The States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially mis-
leading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive. Thus, the Court in Bates suggested that the
remedy in the first instance is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a require-
ment of disclaimers or explanation.
Id. at 203.
75. 114 S. Ct. at 2089.
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advertisements been demonstrably false, the Board would have been
able to regulate those claims, perhaps by imposing an outright ban on
their use.
76
In concluding, the majority noted that Ibanez is a sole legal practi-
tioner, and she did not engage in any professional conduct reserved
exclusively for CPAs.77 For this reason, the Court found significance
in the fact that The Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct au-
thorize use of the CFP designation. 78 Additionally, Ibanez was not ad-
vertising a specialty designation conferred by an organization that had
"made no inquiry into petitioner's fitness" or had simply issued the
designation for a fee.79 Such a designation would be per se misleading
and thus subject to state regulation.80 Finally, the majority reminded
the Board that it had presented a record so bare of substantive justifi-
cation for the restriction of commercial speech, that "[tlo approve the
Board's reprimand of Ibanez would be to risk toleration of commer-
cial speech restraints in the service of . . . objectives that could not
themselves justify a burden on commercial expression."'"
D. The Dissent
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the ma-
jority decision permitting Ibanez's use of the CPA designation. They
dissented, however, on the issue of displaying the CPA and CFP des-
ignations in close proximity without requiring a disclaimer identifying
the conferring organizations, arguing that Ibanez may have created
the potential for misleading the public into believing that the state had
issued, and would monitor, both certifications, rather than just the
CPA certification.82 According to the dissent, had Ibanez included
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2092.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496
U.S. 91, 102 (1990)). The Peel Court defined a caveat under which even truthful statements
about designations issued without fitness or training standards or issued simply for a fee could
be regulated because they are potentially misleading. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane. 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993)).
In one observer's view, the Board's action was more conspicuous as a "botched" prosecution
of an unlicensed accounting firm than as a true professional advertising case. Tellechea Inter-
view, suptra note 9.
82. 114 S. Ct. at 2093.
Petitioner has of course been licensed as a CPA by the State of Florida. But her use of
the CFP designation in close connection with the identification of herself as a CPA
* . .would lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that the two 'certifications' were
conferred by the same entity-the State of Florida.
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some statement explaining what organization had conferred her
certified financial planner designation, the Board's claim would have
carried less merit.
83
Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist also suggested that the Board
could refile its only charge that held some chance of success-practic-
ing public accountancy in an unlicensed accounting firm.84 This would
allow the Board to exert its jurisdiction over Ibanez, revoke her CPA
license, and then discipline her if she continued advertising as a
CPA.83
III. THE FiRST AMENDMENT: SOME SPEECH IS
MORE EQUAL THNm OTiERS
To non-lawyers, Silvia S. Ibanez was merely advertising herself
when she listed her name and professional qualifications in the attor-
ney section of the telephone book, on her law practice business cards,
and on her law office letterhead. To lawyers, however, she was speak-
ing in the realm of commercial speech-the middle ground of the First
Amendment's three-tiered classification of speech protections 6 Maxi-
mally protected against government regulation is political speech, the
theoretical core of the First Amendment.8 7 On the opposite end of the
spectrum is obscenity, which enjoys no protection from government
regulation.88 Adrift in the middle region is commercial speech-pro-
tected from government restraint if it is truthful, yet subject to regula-
tion if it has the potential to mislead, is false, or pertains to illegal
83. Id. ("[l]n the absence of an identified conferring organization, the consumer is likely to
conclude that the CFP designation is conferred by the State.").
84. Id. at 2094 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part):
I would only point out that it is open to the Board to proceed against petitioner for
practicing public accounting in violation of statutory or regulatory standards applica-
ble to Florida accountants .... And if petitioner's public accounting license is re-
voked, the State may constitutionally prohibit her from advertising herself as a CPA.
Id.
85. Id.
86. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF
THm FIRST AMENDMENT § 1.01 (1992).
87. NIMER, supra note 6, § 1.01.
88. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (defining two standards for obscen-
ity: utterly without redeeming social value, and appealing to prurient interest); see also Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Jacobellis contains Justice Stewart's famous and vague definition
of obscenity:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description (hard-core pornography); and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the mo-
tion picture involved in this case is not that.
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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activity.89 Commercial speech, formerly unprotected like obscenity,
has gained this measured degree of protection in the past twenty years
as a method to ensure consumers have access to information they need
for decision-making in the marketplace. 90
This next section gives a brief history of the commercial speech doc-
trine and commercial speech in the context of advertising by attorneys
and other professionals.
A. History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Under the theory of our federalist system of democracy, the Consti-
tution ostensibly grants to the central government only those powers
the states relinquish.91 Thus, Alexander Hamilton asked in the Feder-
alist Papers why our democracy should need constitutional language
expressly protecting the rights of speech, press, religion, and of associ-
ation when the Constitution granted no powers to the federal govern-
ment permitting the abridgement of such rights.Y Several states balked
at Hamilton's idealistic thinking. 9 The.result of this balking, how-
ever, was the Bill of Rights, passed in the first session of Congress in
1789.14 In retrospect, it was wise of the states to require the First
Amendment and the other amendments in the Bill of Rights. Al-
though the language of the First Amendment is absolute-"Congress
shall make no law ... " 95-Congress has enacted, and the Supreme
89. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (striking a Virginia statute declaring unprofessional those pharmacists who advertised
prices of prescription drugs).
90. Id.
91. Although the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution reserve to the states
those powers not specifically enumerated as belonging to the federal government, the Supreme
Court has managed, through the doctrine of implied powers, to grant more power to the federal
government than those expressly mentioned in the Constitution. See generally W.F. Dodd, Im-
plied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE L. J. 137 (1919); Scott
Gardner, Constitutional Law-Tenth Amendment-State Sovereignty as a Limit of Congres-
sional Power, 31 DrJQ. L. REv. 877 (1993); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seri-
ously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv.
1221 (1995).
92. THE FuDsAaisr No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). "For why declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance should it be said that the liberty of the
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?" Id.
93. The holdout states were New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Nod-
MER, supra note 86, § 1.01.
94. The First Amendment as we know it today actually resulted from Congress's third at-
tempt at drafting the provision, which was ratified in 1791. NnoaR, supra note 86, § 1.01.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in full: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
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Court has enforced, many abridgements of the freedoms of speech
and press." One can only imagine what Congress or the executive
branch might have achieved without First Amendment constraints.
9 7
Although the Court has deemed political speech to represent the
founding purpose of the First Amendment,9" commercial speech was,
for many years, not deemed part of that founding purpose.99 As re-
cently as 1942, the Supreme Court held in Valentine v. Chrestensen
that while governments could not "unduly burden or proscribe" oth-
erwise protected speech in public places, the Constitution imposed
"no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial ad-
vertising."'' ' This rule would remain steadfast until 1976, when the
Supreme Court held in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. that the First Amendment affords a
measure of protection for speech pertaining to commercial transac-
tions. 01 The Court based its decision on a policy that consumers re-
ceiving product information could make better-informed purchase
decisions than consumers kept in the dark by government regula-
tions. 0 2 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court rejected
Chrestensen when it invalidated a Virginia statute declaring pharma-
cists unprofessional if they advertised their prices for prescription
96. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("Speech is often provocative
and challenging .... That is why freedom of speech, although not absolute, . . is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless it is shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of serious substantive evil that rise far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest."). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941) (allowing restriction on
an individual's right to speak when he or she uses fighting words).
97. See, e.g., United States v. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (holding in the
Pentagon Papers case that the government had not met its burden to justify prior restraint).
98. The Court quoted Alexander Miekeljohn in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 n.19 (1976). Miekeljohn, a political scientist,
helped shape the idea that political speech resides at the core of the First Amendment. He wrote
that "[tlhe principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government. ft is not a law of nature or of reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the
basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." ALEXANDER
MIEKELXOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 (1948), quoted in Rom
& ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMERCIL FREE SPEECH 36 n.4 (Quorum Books 1985).
For a history of the freedom of speech, see NmsasR, supra note 86, § 1.01, and see Note, First
Amendment-Free Speech-A Prophylactic Ban on Personal Solicitation by Certified Public
Accountants in a Business Context Violates the First Amendment's Guarantee of Freedom of
Speech-Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993), 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1579, 1579-80 nn.1-2
(1994) (providing a synopsis of speech rights from the days of ancient Greece through modern
times).
99. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (providing no protection for double-
sided handbills including both a political protest against New York City wharfage regulations
and an advertisement for the commercial exhibition of a submarine).
100. Id.
101. 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
102. Id.
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drugs. 103 The Court reasoned that the statute could leave consumers
ignorant of information vital to their health,'1 4 and that speech does
not lose its First Amendment protection simply because money is
spent to disseminate the speech.0 5 To justify government regulation of
commercial speech, there must be a more substantial government in-
terest.'l 6
Four years later, when the state of New York attempted to promote
energy efficiency by enacting a blanket ban on advertising that advo-
cated the use of electricity, the Court-as it had in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy-found the statute's scope was broader than nec-
essary to achieve its stated purpose, in this case conservation. 1' In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York, 05 the Court recognized New York's important state in-
terest in promoting energy efficiency and conservation because of the
1970s oil embargoes and attendant escalation of energy prices. 1 9 Nev-
ertheless, the Court held that a blanket ban on utility advertising was
too broad to meet this interest.Y0
Under Central Hudson, a regulation of commercial speech must
pass four hurdles to be valid."' First, the speech must be truthful,
must concern lawful activity, or must not otherwise be subject to reg-
ulation. Second, there must be a substantial government interest in
regulation. Third, thp regulation must directly advance that substan-
tial government interest. Fourth, the regulation cannot reach further
than necessary to achieve its intended result."
2
Since 1980, advertisers generally have received Central Hudson and
the protection of commercial speech enthusiastically."3 Professional
103. Id. at 748.
104. Id. at 765 ("It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be










112. Id. In Central Hudson, the Court found the New York regulation failed on the fourth
prong--arrow tailoring-which often is the weak link in government attempts to regulate
speech. Id. Instead of a blanket ban on advertising, the Court held, New York could have pro-
moted energy conservation through public education or by allowing advertising that advocated
the use of energy-efficient appliances while banning advertising that advocated waste of re-
sources. Id.
113. See generally LAURLENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3 to -4 (2d ed.
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advertisers such as attorneys and certified public accountants have en-
joyed increasingly well-settled commercial speech doctrines allowing
them to advertise free from government regulation in most instances.
Regulators of professional advertising, however, have frequently been
on the losing side of disputes challenging restrictions of such speech.
11 4
State bar associations, in particular, have been challenged by the com-
mercial speech doctrine to craft constitutional regulations of attorney
advertising that address their concern for the public image of the legal
profession yet survive constitutional scrutiny under Central Hud-
son.1 15
1988) (describing the Court's review of traditional speech restrictions); Note, A Missed Opportu-
nity To Definitively Apply the Central Hudson Test: Fane v. Edenfield, 26 CREirGroN L. REV.
1155 (June 1993) (concluding that the court of appeals misapplied the four-part Central Hudson
test in Fane v. Edenfield).
114. See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
115. See Al H. Ringleb et al., Lawyer Direct Mail Advertisements: Regulatory Environment,
Economics, and Consumer Perceptions, 17 PAC. L.J. 1199, 1199 n.1 (1986) (quoting Chief
Justice Warren Burger's comment to the American Bar Association's Commission on Advertis-
ing that potential legal clients should be warned to "never, never, never under any circum-
stances" retain an attorney who advertises), quoted in 24 SaToN HALL L. Rav. 1579, 1582 n.6
(1993); Went For It, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (1lth Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 42 (1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (finding constitutional The Florida Bar's ban on
direct mail solicitation of personal injury or wrongful death clients within 30 days of accident).
In spite of its concerns for protecting the image of the legal profession, the court of appeals in
Went For It adhered to the Supreme Court's commercial speech precedents in the area of profes-
sional advertising and solicitation when it affirmed the lower court's invalidation of Florida's
solicitation ban as an unconstitutional regulation.
We are disturbed that [the cases] require the decision we reach today. We are forced to
recognize that there are members of our profession who would mail solicitation letters
to persons in grief, and we find the Florida Bar's attempt to regulate such intrusions
entirely understandable. Although the Bar may not formally restrict such behavior, an
attorney's conscience, self-respect, and respect for the profession should dictate self-
restraint in this area. To preserve the law as a learned profession demands as much.
Went For It, 21 F.3d at 1045.
The Supreme Court, however, stretched to find the Florida Bar's solicitation ban in conform-
ity with the Central Hudson test for allowing state regulation of commercial speech. Went For
It, 115 S. Ct. 2371f (1995). Concern for the image of the legal profession, previously an inade-
quate justification for permitting state regulation of professional speech, see Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638, 647-48 (1985), be-
came a material consideration when the Court relied on anecdotal evidence provided by The
Florida Bar indicating citizen anger and disgust with direct-mail solicitations from attorneys. 115
S. Ct. at 2382:
We believe that the Florida Bar's 30-day restriction on targeted direct-mail solicitation
of accident victims and their relatives withstands scrutiny under the ... Central Hud-
son test that we have devised for this context. The Bar has substantial interest both in
protecting injured Floridians from invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the
erosion of confidence in the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered.
The Bar's proffered study, unrebutted by respondents below, provides evidence indi-
cating that the harms it targets are far from illusory. The palliative devised by the
Florida Bar to address these harms is narrow both in scope and in duration. The Con-
stitution, in our view, requires nothing more.
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B. The Attorney Advertising Cases
!banez,"6 like Edenfield v. Fane"7 and Went For It, Inc. v. The
Florida Bar,"8 falls into a special category of commercial speech that
involves advertising and solicitation by attorneys and other profes-
sionals.
The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy decision in 1976 specifically
limited its holding to pharmacists and pointed out that "[p]hysicians
and lawyers . .. do not dispense standardized products; they render
professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the
consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they
were to undertake certain kinds of advertising."" 9 Only a year later,
the Court held in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona that an Arizona bar
rule against attorney advertising was a direct governmental restraint
on commercial speech by lawyers and, therefore, violated the First
Amendment.120 The reasoning used by the Court in Bates was similar
to that used in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.12  In Bates, the
Court found Arizona's contention that advertising undermines attor-
ney professionalism "to be severely strained."'
22
116. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994).
117. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (striking Florida's ban against in-person solicitation by CPAs as
contrary to the First Amendment).
118. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2371. Went For It, Inc. is a lawyer referral service that
sought to enjoin enforcement of the Bar's ban against direct mail solicitation of personal injury
and wrongful death clients within 30 days of an accident. Id. See also FLORIDA BAR RULEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.4 (1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit struck the ban as unconstitutionally broad. Went For It, 21 F.3d at 1038. Went For It's
owner, G. Stewart McHenry, is a former member of The Florida Bar who had routinely solicited
personal injury clients before being disbarred for reasons unrelated to the solicitation ban. The
Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992). The court of appeals had found that like
many state bar attempts to regulate commercial speech, Florida's 30-day ban on direct mail
solicitation failed the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test because the ban was crafted too
broadly. Went For It, 21 F.3d at 1038; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a discussion of Central Hudson and its four-part
test, see supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, however, found the 30-
day ban within the confines of the Central Hudson test. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2371 ("The
bar's rule is reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective of eliminating targeted mailings
whose type and timing are a source of distress to Floridians, distress that has caused many of
them to lose respect for the legal profession.").
119. 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976), quoted in Went For It, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct.
2371, 2375 (1995).
120. 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
121. Id. at 350. A year later, the Court dealt with a related issue of personal solicitations
when it decided Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The Court also has devel-
oped a line of cases dealing with direct mail advertising and solicitation. See, e.g., Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding that the Kentucky Bar's prophylactic ban on
direct-mail solicitation was unconstitutional).
122. 433 U.S. at 368.
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Notwithstanding the Bates holding, the Court laid out in dicta sev-
eral conditions under which advertising regulation might be justified.
The Court said false or misleading advertising could be subject to re-
straint;' controls on personal solicitations might be justifiable;124 rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions would be permitted; 2 5
advertisements concerning illegal transactions may be suppressed;
2 6
and radio and television advertising may present concerns for the legal
profession that will warrant special consideration.
27
In spite of the Bates holding, and others like it, the Arizona Bar's
attempted justifications for its ban on legal advertising are embraced
today by those favoring advertising regulation. They argue that adver-
tising harms professionalism; attorney advertising is inherently mis-
leading and undermines the administration of justice; advertising has
undesirable economic impacts; advertising undermines the quality of
legal services; and any advertising regulation, short of a blanket pro-
hibition, would be difficult to enforce. 2 ' These rationales underlie
continued bar association efforts to craft advertising regulations that
protect attorney free speech rights, ensure the public receives accurate
information about available legal services, and shield the legal profes-
sion from the excesses of a few advertisers who violate good taste suf-
ficiently to harm the legal profession's reputation generally.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for instance, per-
mit advertising in telephone directories, in legal directories, in newspa-
pers, on billboards, on the radio, and on television as long as the
advertising is neither false nor misleading. 29 The Florida Bar Rules of
123. Id. at 383.
124. Id. at 383-84.
125. Id. at 384.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. RoME & ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH 64 (Quorum Books
1985).
129. Rule 7.1, Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services, states:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve,
or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison
can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983).
Rule 7.2, Advertising, states:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3 [Direct Contact with Prospective
Clients], a lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a telephone
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Professional Conduct also permit advertising but impose more restric-
tions on attorney advertising than the ABA rules. 130 Generalized attor-
ney advertising enjoys as much protection today under the commercial
speech doctrine as non-attorney advertising, with the exception of tar-
geted mail solicitations soon after personal injury or death.'
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine is relatively
young. 32 It was only fifty years ago, a mere moment in American ju-
risprudence, when the Court strongly affirmed that commercial
speech enjoyed no protection under the First Amendment.' 33 Since
creating the doctrine in 1976134 and announcing in 1980 the four-part
hurdle that government regulation of commercial speech must clear,'35
directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor advertising, radio or
television, or through written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two
years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the law-
yer's services except that a lawyer may
(1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by
this Rule;
(2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal
service organization; and
(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17 [Sale of Law Practicel.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name of at least
one lawyer responsible for its content.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (1983).
130. FLORIDA BAR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.2 (1993). T1he Florida Bar
Rules of Professional Conduct set out provisions allowing attorney advertising in the public
media. The rules require television and radio advertising to be articulated by a single voice de-
void of any background sound other than music. The voice may not be that of a celebrity recog-
nizable by the public. All advertisements must contain the name of at least one of the lawyers
responsible for the ad. Attorney ads require a disclosure indicating that legal representation
should not be purchased based solely on an advertisement. Dramatizations are prohibited. Illus-
trations must be factually substantiated. Ads concerning contingency fees shall include informa-
tion about any fees for which a client may be liable regardless of recovery. Fee arrangements
must be honored for at least 90 days after being advertised. Id.
Permissible content for attorney ads includes: name of the firm or lawyers; dates of admission
to the Bar; technical and professional licenses granted by the state or other recognized licensing
authorities; foreign language ability; fields of practice; and credit card acceptance. Id.
131. See generally Went For It, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2379 (1995) (distin-
guishing generalized mail advertising as protected from targeted direct mail advertising soon af-
ter a personal injury or death as unprotected).
132. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
133. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
134. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
135. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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the Court has pursued a rather steady course of affirming First
Amendment protections for commercial speech and has, until re-
cently,'36 shown predictable hostility toward government regulation of
such speech.'1 The reasoning of Ibanez supports this view of a Court
hostile to almost any regulation of commercial speech. 3 ' It would
seem, however, from Ibanez, that the Court has steered the commer-
cial speech doctrine away from its moorings and may have grown too
hostile to regulation; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy clearly cre-
ated the doctrine as a device to ensure that consumers would have
adequate and accurate information sufficient to make wise decisions
in the marketplace rather than as a device to protect some right of
businesses to speak commercially. The Court was clear that no such
right of business to speak exists independently of the consumer's right
to information.5 9 Stated plainly, the commercial speech doctrine is
founded on consumer protection, not the advancement of business.
Had the Ibanez majority viewed Silvia Ibanez's advertising from the
consumer's eyes, then it may have been inclined to adopt the dissent's
reasoning and permit the Board of Accountancy to require or compel
The Florida Bar to mandate a minimal disclaimer indicating where
consumers could inquire about Ibanez's qualifications. Instead, the
Court fell back on The Florida Bar rule that requires a disclaimer only
when a client or potential client inquires about a professional qualifi-
cation.
The Ibanez dissent viewed the facts of the case more from a consu-
mer's view than did the majority. The consumer's view, after all, is
what drove the holding in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to sup-
port a policy that favors disclosure over concealment in the name of
empowering consumers with the information they need to make
136. Went For It, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
137. For another recent expression of the Court's approach toward commercial speech, see
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (striking down the Federal Alcohol Admin-
istration Act's ban on beer labels that indicate alcohol strength premised on the need to prevent
"strength wars" as a violation of the First Amendment). See also Board of Trustees of the State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (invalidating a restriction on commercial activity
in college dormitories because the government interest failed to be sufficiently " 'substantial'
and the cost 'carefully calculated' ").
For a well-researched article on commercial speech that suggests the Court in Fox redefined
the four-part Central Hudson test, see Denise D. Trumler, Perpetuating Confusion in the Com-
mercial Speech Area: Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 26 CREIGrTON L. Rav. 1193 (1993).
138. See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (striking down the Federal
Alcohol Administration Act's ban on beer labels that indicate alcohol strength premised on the
need to prevent "strength wars" as a violation of the First Amendment).
139. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 478
(1976); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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informed choices. 4' Somehow the majority saw insufficient potential
for consumers to be misled by the side-by-side display of Ibanez's
CPA and CFP designations to justify state regulation. 41 Underlying
the Court's holding is the assumption that people will know who con-
ferred the various designations or, if they do not know, that they will
know where to find out. As the dissent noted, however, the majority
failed to apply Peel properly.142 Had the majority followed Peel, Zau-
derer, and In re R.M.J., it would have seen the need to require a dis-
claimer identifying the organization that had conferred CFP status on
Ibanez. 43 For instance, in Peel, one of the designations indicated it
had been awarded by a national association, not a state association.
No such distinction is clear in the case of Ibanez's CFP and CPA des-
ignations. To rely upon The Florida Bar rule that requires an attorney
to provide information about conferred degrees or specialty designa-
tions only when asked goes against the consumer-oriented reasoning
of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. Why put the burden on the con-
sumer to inquire? When consumers shop for legal services, it is likely
that their lives are in turmoil. Even if not in the midst of a crisis,
consumers of legal services are shopping for services that will affect
their lives much more materially than the purchase of food, clothing,
transportation, or entertainment. Therefore, they should be provided
more information about legal services than about day-to-day matters.
Although the CFP designation was conferred on Ibanez by a repu-
table organization that had inquired into her qualifications, as was the
case in Peel, the facts of Ibanez lacked the other Peel factors permit-
ting such advertising with no disclaimer. Specifically, unlike Peel, the
CFP designation was not verifiable by a simple telephone call because
there was no disclaimer identifying the conferring organization or giv-
ing contact information about it.' 4 Consumers could inquire of an
attorney about these professional qualifications, the Court reasoned.
But will such consumers be in a position to question or evaluate attor-
ney qualifications when they are in need of help regarding legal mat-
ters? Even if they are up to the task of interviewing potential counsel,
will they be informed enough to get all relevant answers? While many
consumers may know that CPA is a designation conferred by the
state, the CFP designation is not so well-known, nor is the source of
140. Id. at 748.
141. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084,
2092 (1994).
142. Id. at 2093-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
143. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
144. !bartez, 114 S. Ct. at 2093-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
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such a designation commonly known. 4 This lack of widespread pub-
lic knowledge about the CFP designation, coupled with the close
placement of the CFP and CPA designations in Ibanez's advertise-
ments, created just the type of potential for confusion that the Court
had contemplated in Peel as a justification for requiring an identifying
disclaimer.
In Peel, the organization in question contained the word "na-
tional" in its name, facially distinguishing it from a state organization
such as the Board of Accountancy.146 Therefore, because the two con-
ferring organizations in Ibanez were not distinguished facially, and
because their designations both contained the word "certified," the
dissent correctly concluded there was potential for misleading the pub-
lic. 47 To ignore the potential for confusion under these facts reveals
the weakness of the Court's reasoning.
The dissent reasoned that even if the consumer most likely would
know the state had conferred the CPA status and therefore would
have some idea of how to verify that designation, the consumer would
have no way of knowing how to verify Ibanez's CFP designation.'4
The dissent would have held that if the Board's absolute ban on the
use of specialty designations containing the term "certified" could not
stand against Ibanez because it was too broad, the Board should have
been allowed to require information identifying the CFP-conferring
organization.'4 9 This, it seems, is a better result than the majority's
wholesale reliance upon The Florida Bar rule requiring the advertising
attorney to disclose only when asked.
If the Court wanted to protect legal consumers from being misled,
this was an area where common sense could have justified a minimal
restriction on professional commercial speech in the form of a dis-
claimer. To do so would have been to remain true to the foundations
145. Id. at 2092.
146. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 108
(1990).
147. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2093.
States may not completely ban potentially misleading commercial speech if narrower
limitations can ensure that the information is presented in a nonmisleading man-
ner .... But if a professional's certification claim has the potential to mislead, the
State may "requir[e] a disclaimer about the certifying organization or the standards of
a specialty ...." The Board has done just that: An advertisement that "[sitates or
implies that the licensee has received formal recognition as a specialist in any aspect of
the practice of public accounting" will be deemed false or misleading, "unless the
statement contains a disclaimer stating that the recognizing agency is not affiliated
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of the commercial speech doctrine articulated in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy. The Court would not have been breaking any new
ground in commercial speech doctrine to have so held. 150
To require the inclusion of at least the conferring organization's
name would have given interested consumers a lead to follow in veri-
fying the advertiser's credentials without burdening the consumer with
the task of asking the advertiser for the information. Common sense
dictates that attorney advertising may reach the consumers who most
need protection from potentially misleading or confusing information.
How many first-time legal clients have the experience to know they
should inquire about an attorney's qualifications and training? How
many first-time clients have the savvy to demand such information?
Frequent legal consumers have the benefit of experience-either to
continue a relationship with an attorney with whom they have dealt
previously or to look elsewhere. Would these frequent legal consumers
not have the benefit of word-of-mouth or other resources to know
where to find another attorney? For experienced legal consumers,
such advertising and disclaimers are of reduced value. How many cor-
porate clients respond to such advertising and disclaimers? Corporate
clients are perhaps the best educated legal consumers and least in need
of protection from potentially misleading information about qualifi-
cations and experience. It seems plain that first-time legal consumers
or infrequent legal consumers are in greatest need of protection from
potentially misleading advertising. Their informed decision-making is
a government interest sufficient to have permitted the bar's requiring
at least a disclaimer in Ibanez's case.
The Court in Peel required a disclajmer identifying the organization
that had conferred attorney Peel's status as a trial specialist.'51 Requir-
ing a similar disclaimer from Ibanez would eliminate potential confu-
sion, ease the burden on consumers wishing to educate themselves
about professional services, and impose no significant restraint on the
professional advertiser's ability to speak commercially." 2
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court adopted a rigid adherence to First Amendment
precedent in upholding Silvia Ibanez's right to advertise truthful
150. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 496 U.S.
91(1990).
151. Id.
152. "The ads should not be misleading on their face. The burden should not be on the
potential client to decipher what is misleading." Tellechea Interview, supra note 9. Mr. Tellechea
described as "disturbing" Justice Souter's comment that even if a specialty designation were
potentially misleading, a potential client with a simple telephone call could ask the advertising
attorney or accountant to explain the designation. Id. Justice Souter's comment was embodied in
the majority opinion. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2090 n.9.
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information about herself. The Court's straightforward analysis
sought to protect consumers by placing access to information ahead
of government regulation. Yet, the Court slipped into formulaic rea-
soning when it allowed Ibanez to use the CPA and CFP designations
side by side without permitting the state to require an identifying dis-
claimer. As The Florida Bar recognizes in its Rules of Professional
Conduct, consumers should not bear the burden of discovering what
organizations have conferred various specialty designations. 53 A
closer application of the Peel standard would have honored the Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy's policy of disclosure over conceal-
ment while also honoring Central Hudson's allowance of just enough
government regulation to ensure that consumers could receive mean-
ingful commercial information.
A year after the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy decision blazed a
trail for protecting commercial speech generally, the Court's holding
in Bates defined a path for attorney advertising. 54 Some saw Bates as
signaling a decline in respect for the legal profession,' 5 while others
viewed attorney advertising as necessary to ensure the public receives
adequate information to make informed choices, as in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy.'5 6 Bates was handed down less than twenty years
ago,'5 7 and the regulation of professional commercial speech remains
an evolving field of law. Whether bar associations and other profes-
sional regulators will be able to craft restrictions on advertising tai-
lored narrowly enough to meet either Central Hudson's test"5 -or the
153. See supra note 130.
154. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
155. Id. at 389 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
[I]t is clear that within undefined limits today's decision will effect profound changes
in the practice of law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession. The supervisory
power of the courts over members of the bar, as officers of the courts, and the au-
thority of the respective States to oversee the regulation of the profession have been
weakened. Although the Court's opinion professes to be framed narrowly, and its
reach is subject to future clarification, the holding is explicit and expansive with re-
spect to the advertising of undefined 'routine legal services.' In my view, this result is
neither required by the First Amendment, nor in the public interest.
Id.
156. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976); see also Went For It, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). In finding little or no justification for The Florida Bar's 30-day ban on
direct-mail solicitation, Justice Kennedy agreed with the lower court that the time immediately
after a personal injury or wrongful death is exactly the time when potential clients in such mat-
ters might need legal counsel and a 30-day ban on solicitation might jeopardize potential clients'
ability to protect their legal rights. Id.
157. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
158. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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more-recent test of Board of Regents of the State University of New
York v. Fox'59 -while still favoring a policy of disclosure over con-
cealment, remains an open question. Given the Court's willingness to
strike commercial speech restrictions, regulators face a difficult task.
159. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).

